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An environment for the activities of the International Monetary Fund (the IMF) has fun-
damentally changed over the two recent decades. The strong development of financial 
innovations as well as of financial globalisation was among major forces driving the change 
and shaping the economic growth worldwide. As some economies were able - with the 
support from financial markets – to accelerate their growth, other countries suffered from 
turbulences, which were reinforced and transferred internationally through the volatile fi-
nancial markets. The process of international financial contagion makes the case for global 
financial governance, which so far has been left behind the development of markets.
The IMF is mandated to play a central role in the global governance designed to ensure finan-
cial stability. The article reconsiders the Fund’s role and includes an overview and assessment 
of its activities, particularly in the context of the global financial crisis in 2007-2010. In the 
aftermath of this crisis, the international financial stability may, however, again be at risk as 
several external imbalances in the global economy may be hardly sustainable. It is argued 
in the paper that, in addition to a gradually improving surveillance and lending as well as to 
adjusting resources by the Fund, an enhanced credibility of the institution is needed so that its 
role in the process of the stabilising global financial system is strong and effective.
Introduction and Overview
Several  recent  decades  have  been  witnessing  an  in-
creasing deepening of financial systems as well as their 
international broadening. The development of financial 
systems - in terms of the quantity, quality and diversity 
of market participants, procedures, instruments as well 
as resources - has been impressive. Simultaneously, the 
pace of integrating domestic financial systems into an 
international network has accelerated and fuelled the 
process of financial globalisation, bringing it ahead of 
the globalisation of other sectors of the economy.
The links of finance to growth have been extensively 
examined in the economic literature. These linkages 
rank among the fundamental topics in the analysis of 
growth. The interest of economists and policy mak-
ers in the link between finance and growth has been 
motivated – to a large degree – by the performance 
of the US economy, which is most advanced  in both 
economic and financial terms. For many years, the US 
has been achieving relatively high GDP growth rates 
while, simultaneously, enjoying rapid development of 
the financial sector and providing a benchmark for 
other countries.
There  is  a  strong  view  advocating  that,  domesti-
cally, financial development positively affects growth. 
This view rests heavily on the assumption of perfect 
financial markets, which are also efficient. Improved 
financial markets, institutions and products can affect 
growth by raising the fraction of savings available for 
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investment, facilitating the process of trading and of 
risk pooling and, above all, by improving the alloca-
tion of capital and producing a higher total factor pro-
ductivity (McKinnon, 1973; Levine, 1997; Summers, 
2000).  More  specific  debates  on  the  nexus  between 
finance and growth include such issues as measure-
ments of the financial depth, the structure of financial 
systems (in particular, the role of bank-based vs. capi-
tal market-based system) and a potential reverse cau-
sation from growth to financial development (Khan & 
Senhadji, 2000). The effects of the financial sector for 
growth are amplified in an international environment. 
A domestic process of financial deepening is comple-
mented by the global process of financial broadening. 
Growth-enhancing effects of an improved allocation of 
capital and of the better diversification of risk increase 
as these processes occur worldwide. Free capital flows 
are considered fundamentally sound. Through an im-
proved allocation of capital and better diversification 
of risk, they enhance growth and help smooth con-
sumption (e.g. Fischer, 1998; Summers, 2000). In ad-
dition, more refined approaches conclude that several 
relevant domestic factors – such as strong development 
of a financial sector, prudent macroeconomic policy, 
strengthened institutional frameworks, improved pub-
lic and corporate governance – correlate with external 
capital inflows. Depending on causality, these factors 
are considered either as conditions/thresholds needed 
to achieve growth benefits or as additional benefits/
collaterals to growth (Kose et al., 2006). In particular, 
the availability of capital is broadened for the capital-
scarce, less developed economies and is strengthening 
their opportunities to converge to economically ad-
vanced countries (Henry, 2007; Frankel, 2010). 
Numerous  empirical  studies  confirm  a  positive 
causal relationship from finance to growth, regarding 
as causes both the level of development of the finan-
cial sector (e.g. King & Levine, 1993) and financial 
globalisation  (e.g.  Henry,  2007).  An  experience  of 
several European emerging economies demonstrates 
that a financial system, which was developed, to a large 
extent, through linkages with Western Europe, can be 
a positive factor for income convergence (Abiad et al., 
2007). EU financial regional policy transfers add – to 
quantitative effects – also improvements of develop-
ment policies in the new EU member states (Kengyel, 
2009).
Under the opposite view, the assumption of perfect 
and efficient financial markets is challenged. Instead, 
these  markets  are  characterised  by  several  failures, 
such as information asymmetries or herding behaviour 
(Greenwald & Stiglitz, 1986). The process of financial 
development can also fuel market imperfections and 
increase  aggregate  financial  risks.  Global  financial 
markets serve as amplifiers of those risks as well as 
channels of domestic financial turbulences worldwide. 
Under  this  approach,  distortions  dominate  over  ef-
ficiency  while  benefits  yielded  to  individual  market 
participants may be detrimental to overall stability and 
welfare (Eichengreen & Mussa, 1998).  
A vast amount of research has advanced the devel-
opment of the theory of financial crises. As these crises 
usually have the common, general background – un-
sustainable macroeconomic imbalances and misalign-
ment of asset prices and of exchange rates – currency, 
banking, asset as well as foreign debt crises tend to oc-
cur together or around the same time, although this 
does not necessarily always imply  a causal relation-
ship. Banking and currency crises are referred to as 
“twin crises” (Goldstein, 2005). In particular, extensive 
studies on a currency crisis have produced a compre-
hensive typology running from first-generation mod-
els associated with inadequate macroeconomic poli-
cies (Krugman, 1979; Flood & Garber, 1984), through 
the  second-generation  associated  with  multiple  dis-
equilibria (Obstfeld, 1994; Obstfeld, 1996), to third-
generation eclectic models associated with combined 
macro- and microeconomic issues (McKinnon & Phil, 
1996; Corsetti, Pesenti & Roubini, 1998). 
Over the two recent decades, financial crises have 
been  occurring  with  an  increasing  frequency  and 
depth. The global crisis of 2007-2010 has predomi-
nantly affected economies with developed and sophis-
ticated financial systems, such as the US or Western 
Europe. Local financial turbulences have been easily 
spreading internationally within the process of finan-
cial contagion.
An increased occurrence of financial crises and their 
international outreach has revitalised the debate on the 
role of the financial development in economic growth. 
In particular, the role of the IMF – the institution man-
dated to play a central role in ensuring global financial 
stability – has been put to a strong test. Towards the 
end of the 2010 decade, the turn from the global finan-6 R. Wilczyński   
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cial crisis to a world recovery coincides with the 65th 
anniversary of the Fund. In the economic literature, 
positive assessments of the IMF role in stabilising the 
international financial system and enhancing growth, 
particularly of economies under transition, have been 
- over time - increasingly joined by the criticism of the 
institution (e.g. Feldstein, 1998; Radelet & Sachs, 1998; 
Stiglitz, 2002). 
The article reconsiders the IMF role and identifies 
avenues for its strengthening. It is organised as follows. 
Section 1 discusses an increasing international finan-
cial  contagion  which  makes  the  case  for  the  global 
financial governance. In subsequent sections, several 
areas of IMF policies, which are relevant for financial 
contagion,  are  examined:  those  regarding  interna-
tional capital flows (section 2); surveillance, exchange 
rates and global imbalances (section 3) and lending 
policies (section 4). Some issues of the Fund’s internal 
governance, which affect the credibility of the institu-
tion, are discussed in section 5. The final section briefly 
concludes.
1. Financial Contagion and the Case 
for Global Governance
The 1990s and 2000s brought a tremendous increase 
in the magnitude of the international financial flows, 
together with the surge in their volatility. Several big 
crisis episodes affected some economies and spread 
to others. Apart from the 2007-2010 US-rooted glob-
al crisis, there were two major waves of turbulence 
on financial markets affecting a remarkable number 
of both emerging and advanced economies. In the 
mid-1990s,  turbulences  started  as  currency  crises 
and spread to other financial segments and to real 
sectors of emerging economies, ranging from Mexico 
to East Asia, with Russia and Brazil as major cases. In 
the early 2000s, an excessive boom in high-tech assets 
valuations in the US, together with the WorldCom, 
Enron  and  Arthur  Andersen  defaults,  has  ignited 
a recession in the US, which has spread to other ad-
vanced economies in Europe and has also coincided 
with  financial  disruptions  in  emerging  economies 
like Argentina, Turkey and Ecuador. In 2007, the col-
lapse of the world’s largest US financial sector took 
the real economy down to a deep recession and the 
US  financial  and  economic  turmoil  has  developed 
into a global crisis.
The global financial governance becomes an issue 
when  the  process  of  spreading  financial  turbulence 
across countries – referred to as financial contagion – 
is gaining momentum. 
Two factors are relevant for contagion. First, it is an 
involvement of the systemically important economy or 
of the financial centre (they are usually the same area), 
which may be the source of strong regional, or even 
world-wide,  spillovers.  The  common  shocks,  such  as 
a steep rise in world interest rates, strong deterioration 
of global output or sharp shifts in investors’ sentiment, 
are usually rooted in developments in large and signifi-
cant economies. The Latin American debt crisis of the 
1980s as well as the Mexican crisis in 1994/95 was trig-
gered by a considerable increase in US interest rates. In 
2007, the turmoil of the US financial sector and the col-
lapse of demand in the US has ignited a credit crunch 
and a deterioration of economic activity in many coun-
tries as well as the flight of investors to a safe haven from 
economies perceived as vulnerable to the crisis, some-
times regardless of their fundamentals. 
Secondly,  financial  (and  other)  linkages  serve  as 
channels for contagion and affect its magnitude. These 
linkages are likely to be considerable among neigh-
bouring  economies  and  manifest  themselves  in  the 
form of large, cross-border financial exposures.
The large presence of Western European banks in 
Eastern Europe during the 2007-2010 financial crisis 
is a relevant case. Prior to the crisis, Western European 
parent banks have been increasingly funding their sub-
sidiaries in Eastern Europe in order to allow them to 
meet the rapidly growing demand for loans. However, 
in case of problems on any side and regardless of their 
reputational  considerations,  parent  banks  might  be 
unwilling or unable to continue lending to their sub-
sidiaries. In Europe, an increasing size of parent sub-
sidiaries, or more broadly, home-host exposures, have 
been enhanced by their growing concentration as well 
as by “the common lender” cases, and resulted in the 
magnified regional financial contagion.
The case for the mutual non-negligible exposures, 
heavy concentration and, therefore, serious but con-
fined contagion risks, refers to Swedish bank owner-
ship in the Baltic states. The region-wide contagion 
was - in the early 2009 - more likely in the case of 
Austrian banks, which are visibly exposed and more 
diversified across emerging Europe and could be the www.contemporary-economics.eu
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source, or the common lender, in the process of re-
gional spillovers. On the one hand, due to their heavy 
dependence on Austrian banks, the Balkans were espe-
cially vulnerable (MacFarquhar & Pinder, 2009; Arvai 
et al., 2009).  On the other hand, against the finan-
cial instability of many Eastern European economies 
in the early 2009, Austria was, albeit shortly and not 
unanimously, considered to be at risk of financial in-
stability. It was estimated that in the case of banking 
crisis in Eastern Europe, the mostly affected countries 
would be Austria and Sweden, assuming that parent 
banks would recapitalise their subsidiaries, or Balkans 
and Baltic states, assuming that host countries would 
decide to keep their banks afloat with fiscal injections 
(MacFarquhar & Pinder, 2009).
In 2010, the Eurozone fiscal crisis has ignited a con-
siderable stress in the EU sovereign debt markets. Al-
most half of the total public debt of the most heavily in-
debted Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland is owed 
to creditors concentrated in three countries: UK, France 
and Germany. The most heavily indebted countries owe 
a certain, lower position of their debts to one other. Al-
together, we arrive at a complicated cobweb of exposures 
and at a door that opens to a regional contagion. 
In the middle of 2010, rumours of  the bad shape of 
Hungarian public finances brought some presumption 
of a possible contagion in Europe as European banks 
and investors were strongly present on the Hungarian 
market. The risk of contagion was cushioned with the 
new fiscal austerity measures undertaken by the au-
thorities.
Financial linkages help propagate contagion which, 
obviously, go beyond regions. In 2007-2008, the US 
financial turmoil led to systemic problems in the inter-
national banking sectors of Western Europe. US “toxic 
assets” were concentrated in highly leveraged Euro-
pean financial institutions. The sharp deterioration of 
funding channelled the crisis to the real economy in 
Europe. By contrast, the then limited financial linkages 
to advanced countries of emerging Asia have reduced 
spillovers to Asian financial institutions, whereas the 
region  felt  the  global  crisis  predominantly  through 
trade channels.
Given  the  existing  common  shocks  and  interna-
tional linkages, the magnitude of contagion depends, 
ultimately, on the vulnerability of individual econo-
mies when facing the crisis. During the 2007-2010 cri-
sis, some economies of emerging Europe (e.g. Poland) 
turned out to be relatively resilient to external shocks, 
whereas others (e.g. Latvia, Hungary, Romania) were 
vulnerable  and  were  severely  affected  by  a  regional 
market turbulence. In order to be able to survive, the 
countries of the latter group had to search for an inter-
national financial support.
The magnitude and longevity of contagion depends 
upon possible exits from the crisis. The wave of cur-
rency crises lasting from the mid- to late-1990s was 
basically confined to a group of emerging economies 
as many advanced countries remained unaffected and 
could help others get out of problems. In the early 
2000s,  the  crisis  affected  (mainly  high-tech)  corpo-
rates in the advanced countries, while the exit was left 
through  households,  banks  and  a  real  estate  sector 
as well as through emerging markets. From 2007 on-
wards, the crisis has spread from the real estate market 
to companies and banks in the US and to other ad-
vanced countries as well as to emerging markets. The 
only exit from this overall turbulence turned out to be 
the large increase in public sector indebtedness, which 
– as can be seen in the case of southern Eurozone 
member countries as well as of Ireland – posed other 
serious risks. To contain these risks, the international 
financial support from the EU and the IMF was need-
ed. However, unless the public debt in these countries 
is cut, the exit can hardly be seen on the horizon.
The waves of international financial crises and of 
contagion manifest the case for global financial gov-
ernance. Due to their inherent failures associated with 
the information asymmetries, financial markets tend 
to react excessively and to abruptly switch their be-
haviour. Such responses lead to extreme volatilities as 
well as produce negative externalities. The amount of 
externalities increases across frontiers and is fuelled by 
financial globalisation. Loss of investors’ confidence in 
one economy may also affect other economies in a peer 
group, although in the latter case, the flight of investors 
may be unrelated to fundamentals. As a result, the in-
ternational financial contagion is gaining momentum. 
A developing contagion implies problems that cannot 
be dealt with exclusively by individual countries. Si-
multaneously, the stability of the global monetary and 
financial system may be at risk.
Nearly all stakeholders have an interest in maintain-
ing the stability of the system as it helps to distribute 8 R. Wilczyński   
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financial resources across countries more efficiently. 
This common goal, or a public good, implies an effort 
undertaken by a number of countries together; since 
then,  it  is  more  effective.  In  the  past,  international 
governance actions have been heavily influenced by 
national  and  regional  considerations.  Global  finan-
cial governance seems to have been “left behind the 
curve”. Over time, a coordinating approach has been 
increasingly declared, although less often implement-
ed. Governance actions should be designed to better 
identify financial interconnectedness and locate, assess 
and eliminate the weak spots in the financial network, 
which are relevant for building up systemic risk. The 
IMF is the natural platform to play the central role in 
these actions.
2. IMF and International Capital Flows
The  stability  of  the  international  financial  system 
depends,  to  a  considerable  degree,  on  international 
capital flows. These flows have surged during the last 
two decades. An accelerated growth of capital flows 
reflects – in broad terms – the progress in financial 
globalisation, with the IT revolution and the explo-
sion  of  financial  innovations  as  strong  contributing 
factors. Private capital flows from industrial to devel-
oping economies have increased from 174 billion dol-
lars during the 1980s to 1.3 trillion dollars during the 
1990s (Summers, 2000). During the 2000s, these flows 
have increased further; they peaked around 2007 and, 
after a deterioration during the global financial crisis, 
they continue increasing during and after 2010. Inter-
national capital flows have dwarfed trade flows and 
replaced them as the determinant component of the 
payments balances .
Together with the growth in magnitude, an increased 
volatility of capital flows has been one of the profound 
developments in international finance over recent de-
cades. The waves of surges and drops in capital flows 
can be identified. The excessive surges in inflows were 
among factors leading to the currency and financial 
turmoil in several countries. The Latin American debt 
crisis in the 1980s, the Asian currency crisis in 1997 or 
the global financial crisis in 2007-2010 were preceded 
by considerable surges in capital inflows to emerging 
economies.  Those  inflows,  however,  suddenly  and 
abruptly reversed, directly contributing to the eruption 
of the crisis and catalysing financial contagion. In each 
case, the confidence of investors to the whole class of 
emerging economies has dropped visibly.
Historic examples of the nexus between the capital 
flows and the rate of economic growth as well as its 
volatility are considerably mixed. During the 2000s, 
several economies of emerging Europe were able to 
converge with Western Europe largely due to an in-
creased inflow of external private capital, even allow-
ing for the positive impact of their EU membership 
(Cihak & Mitra, 2009). However, an extremely rapid 
growth is also possible with capital flows that are not 
liberalised as can be demonstrated by the experience 
of Japan in the 1950s and the 1960s and of China in 
the 1990s. 
Regarding  growth  volatility,  examples  of  capital 
flows which help stabilise growth refer mainly to FDI, 
while in the case of non-FDI flows, the opposite im-
pact dominates the picture. In particular, Williamson 
concludes that in the late 1990s, the most affected by 
the crisis was economies with liberalised capital flows, 
such as Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea, whereas 
other countries, such as China or India, with similar 
macroeconomic characteristics but less liberal on capi-
tal flows turned out to be relatively resilient (William-
son et al., 2003). Against this diversity of individual 
examples, it is not surprising that the evidence from 
cross-country studies, with differences in methodol-
ogy, is also not clear-cut.
The issue of international capital flows is linked to 
IMF responsibilities, namely those for the stability of 
the international monetary system as well as for ex-
change rates and payment balances of Fund members. 
In 1944, under Article VI of the Articles of Agreement 
countries, they were permitted, when they considered 
as necessary, to exercise control over overall capital 
flows, whereas the role of the IMF was limited and 
somewhat  ambiguous.  The  decision  undertaken  in 
Bretton Woods reflected concerns over volatile inter-
national capital movements and their effects under-
mining the independence of national policies in the 
interwar period. The new, post-war monetary system 
was supposed to be stable and to encourage trade and 
growth.
Many perceive the IMF as an institution, which has 
permanently, strongly and indiscriminately been advo-
cating capital account liberalisation. This is not accu-
rately so; at both conceptual and operational levels, the www.contemporary-economics.eu
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Fund has rather been adjusting its position to changing 
developments in capital flows. What matters more is 
whether the IMF actions were retro- or proactive.
During the early to mid-1990s, when external capital 
inflows have been fuelling growth of many economies, 
the Fund has been paying greater attention to capital 
account issues and made efforts to amend Articles of 
Agreement to gain greater jurisdiction over the capital 
account. At that time, the IMF tended to overempha-
sise benefits and to undervalue risks associated with 
the liberalisation of capital flows. Several East Asian 
economies, which decided to fully and quickly libera-
lise their capital accounts, did not receive timely and 
adequate warnings, arguably also from the IMF, against 
risks of sudden flow reversals and of currency crisis. It 
was, therefore, not surprising that the efforts, subject 
to safeguards, to include capital account liberalisation 
in the Articles as an obligation of members failed to 
receive sufficient support among the Fund members. 
Instead of an amendment of the Articles, the Fund 
has arrived at the concept of the “orderly” capital ac-
count liberalisation, which included a set of necessary 
preconditions, e.g. building strong domestic financial 
systems as well as the rationale for implementing the 
liberalisation  along  the  appropriate  sequence,  from 
less to more volatile types of flows.
Temporary  and  preferably  market-based  capital 
controls were not excluded as a prudential measure. 
Prior to that, however, several countries have imple-
mented such measures. Evidence from these episodes 
is  mixed,  with  some  cases,  e.g.  of  Chile,  which  are 
acknowledged as more successful in lengthening the 
maturity of capital inflows and with less consensus on 
reducing their levels. 
In addition, the IMF concept of the orderly capital 
account  liberalisation  was  not  an  entirely  new  one. 
Poland has launched the process of the cautious and 
gradual  liberalisation  already  existent  in  the  early 
1990s.  FDI  flows  were  liberalised  in  1991;  the  first 
measures on liberalisation of portfolio flows were en-
acted in 1993 and have been gradually extended during 
the decade. Short-term flows were fully liberalised in 
2002. Successive liberalising steps were consistent with 
comprehensive macroeconomic reforms and with the 
strengthening of the financial system. Poland’s econo-
my turned out to be relatively crisis-resilient as com-
pared to other emerging European economies, such as 
Russia or the Czech Republic, which liberalised capital 
flows fully and promptly.
During the 2000s, the IMF increasingly and pro-
actively responded on the operational level to devel-
opments  relevant  to  international  capital  flows.  The 
Fund timely warned emerging European economies, 
in particular the Baltic states, against the risks of mac-
roeconomic destabilisation associated with the surge 
of external capital inflows and with the boom in do-
mestic loans, also in foreign currencies. The IMF paid 
much attention to risks to the international monetary 
system, which are associated with the increasing global 
imbalances by providing a timely and comprehensive 
analysis and undertaking efforts designed to imple-
ment counteractive policies. When the next surge in 
capital inflows to emerging economies was predicted 
for and was materialising in the 2010, their sustainabil-
ity and domestic impact were also comprehensively 
examined (IMF, 2010). 
During the 2000s, the Fund became increasingly ac-
commodative of the use of capital controls, albeit un-
der many conditions. It carried out a comprehensive 
analysis and assessment of the effectiveness of differ-
ent types of capital controls implemented during the 
decade. Most measures are effective on the volume of 
outflows and on maturity, rather than on the volume 
of inflows. Market-based measures have similar effects 
as administrative controls. In any case, capital controls 
may be regarded as temporary, complementing mea-
sures after chief instruments of macroeconomic policy 
and prudential regulation are exhausted. It has to be 
emphasised that the IMF points out also to multilat-
eral, mainly adverse, effects of capital controls, such as 
capital  market  distortions,  preventing  the  necessary 
appreciation of undervalued currencies or expanding 
the international contagion of control measures (Ostry 
et al., 2010).
The proposals of more permanent capital controls, 
such as a small transaction Tobin-type tax on all for-
eign exchange transactions, such as that proposed by 
Rodrik, do not comply with the Fund’s toolkit (Hel-
leiner, 2009).
For the near future, in view of the likely divergence of 
positions among the membership on the amendment 
of the Articles, other proactive actions of the Fund 
could be envisaged. One possible avenue is to work out 
common guidelines on capital flows and incorporate 10 R. Wilczyński   
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them, as non-binding recommendations, in bilateral 
and multilateral surveillance. The issue is pressing as 
the IMF is given the responsibility to ensure the stabil-
ity of the international financial system, for which the 
stability of capital flows is highly relevant. 
3. IMF Surveillance, Exchange Rates 
and Global Imbalances
Promoting exchange rate stability is among the pur-
poses of the IMF. This objective is clearly related to 
other key purposes of the institution, such as facili-
tating  the  growth  of  international  trade,  preventing 
disequilibrium in the external balances of members as 
well as cooperation on international monetary prob-
lems (Article 1 of the Articles of Agreement). In order 
to achieve these purposes, the Fund is entitled to exer-
cise firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies 
of members. The surveillance process should address 
monetary stability not only of individual countries, but 
also of the whole international system to ensure its ef-
fective operation (Article IV, Section 3).
Exchange rate policies include several issues like the 
exchange rate regime and level and its misalignment as 
well as other problems, such as international competi-
tiveness and external imbalances, which are directly 
affected by the exchange rates.
The issue of the optimal exchange rate regime has 
been debated among economists for a long time. The 
debate gained particular momentum in the 1970’s, af-
ter the Bretton Woods system was replaced with the 
system of floating exchange rates among major curren-
cies. In the increasingly open economies, the choice of 
the exchange rate regime significantly affects macro-
economic policies.
Different regimes, in particular for emerging mar-
ket economies, have been advocated over time. The 
overall advocacy moved from fixed – in the early 1990s 
– to floating regimes around the end of the decade; 
then the support turned to a bipolar view, to corner 
solutions at the detriment of intermediate regimes, and 
again towards flexible systems, to ultimately lead to the 
conclusion that there is no unique, best regime. Each 
regime has its strengths and weaknesses. What matters 
is rather an individual macroeconomic environment. 
A currency board worked well in Hong Kong in 1997-
1998 during the time of the Asian crisis, but collapsed 
in Argentina in 2001. In 2008-2009, a floating regime 
helped Poland weather the crisis well and did not help 
Hungary. Similarly, under the managed floating regime 
in 2009, Indonesia was able to maintain high growth 
rate, while Thailand and Malaysia fell into recession. It 
has to be emphasised that the IMF members have the 
right to determine their own exchange rate regime.
The Fund should not be in a position to directly de-
termine the optimal level of the exchange rate. Identi-
fying  misalignments  with  the  equilibrium  level,  that 
is based on fundamentals, should not be equivalent to 
fine-tuning the exchange rate configuration. However, 
the institution needs quantitative assessments in order 
to be able to provide advice on exchange rate policies 
of its members. These assessments carried out under 
bilateral surveillance should be consistent with the cir-
cumstances in the global monetary setting examined by 
multilateral surveillance. The Fund’s role on exchange 
rates is extremely complex and politically difficult.
In an uncertain environment of the aftermath of the 
Bretton Woods system in 1977, the IMF has approved 
the Decision on surveillance. The Decision narrowed 
the scope of the Fund’s responsibility as it focused ex-
clusively on the bilateral exchange rate surveillance. 
In particular, the Decision addressed the problem of 
devaluations designed to gain an unfair competitive 
advantage. The Fund’s Decision, however, failed to ful-
ly address issues arising from financial globalisation, 
which are also relevant to the exchange rates.
Two recent decades saw the process of building up 
global  imbalances,  i.e.  of  a  pattern  of  large  current 
account surpluses in some economies and deficits in 
others.  On  the  surplus  side,  the  leading  economies 
of China and Japan were joined by other East Asian 
countries, Middle East and other major oil exporters, 
and Germany. The deficit side is dominated by the US 
and includes also the UK as well as countries of South-
ern and Eastern Europe. In the peak 2006 year, the US 
deficit was around 6% of GDP, while the Chinese sur-
plus climbed to almost 10% of the GDP.
The concerns over such a pattern have been increas-
ing over time. It was argued that imbalances originate 
from distortions, such as a bubble-driven asset inflation 
and excessive public borrowing in deficit countries (e.g. 
Cline, 2005). Other causes of imbalances were identi-
fied: the underdevelopment of financial systems, lack 
of social insurance, export-led growth with underval-
ued currencies and excessive accumulation of reserves www.contemporary-economics.eu
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in surplus countries as well as unusually high world oil 
prices (Blanchard & Milesi-Ferretti, 2009). The main 
risk was that, at some point, a relatively smooth ad-
justment, under which surplus economies have been 
financing  deficits  of  their  counterparties,  would  be 
suddenly disrupted. That would result in a sharp and 
disorderly depreciation of the US dollar and lead to the 
turmoil in currency markets and in international flows 
and also adversely affect the real economy.
Under a different view, global imbalances reflected 
a  savings  and  investment  behaviour,  which  was  re-
sponding to natural differences in the rates of return 
on capital and in the degree of risk and liquidity. In 
particular, as a major supplier of financial assets, the 
US attracted savings from elsewhere. Under this “new 
paradigm”, such trend was a structural one and could 
be continued for a long time (Xafa, 2007). 
While  views  on  the  link  from  global  imbalances 
to the global financial crisis also differ, the prevailing 
mainstream  position  seems  to  emerge  that  whereas 
imbalances  contributed  to  increasing  asset  bubbles 
and to distortions in financial markets and, therefore, 
to the eruption of the crisis, the more prominent role 
in the crisis should be attributed to other factors, such 
as an inadequate financial regulation and supervision.
The global financial crisis has brought some unwind-
ing of global imbalances. Due to some rebalancing of 
demand (in favour of surplus countries) and shifts in 
terms of trade (in favour of oil importers) as well as to 
past dollar depreciation (until the autumn of 2008), in 
2009, current account imbalances contracted visibly in 
the US, Europe and in oil-exporting economies. How-
ever, some of these adjustments are cyclical, so risks 
related to global imbalances cannot be excluded also 
in the medium term. In particular, in the US and other 
advanced countries, the contraction in private demand 
was being partly offset by a fiscal deterioration. In Asia, 
surpluses are likely to continue. Crisis-related, lower 
oil prices are going into reverse, so current account 
surpluses of oil exporters are being restored. IMF base-
line medium term projections predict a slight decline 
in the US current account deficit and increases of sur-
pluses in China and oil exporters as counterparts. In 
a net result, global imbalances would stabilise. How-
ever, one could also think of worse scenarios. Some 
authors allow for such scenarios and suggest that im-
balances are not the problem of the past and still have 
to be addressed (Blanchard & Milesi-Ferretti, 2009). 
What matters here is the policies of major “players” as 
well as the IMF surveillance.
Prior  to  the  global  crisis,  when  imbalances  have 
been mushrooming, the Fund has responded to the 
process  on  several  fronts.  First,  the  institution  pro-
vided a timely and comprehensive diagnosis. Second, 
the IMF worked out scenarios, including a scenario of 
a sudden unwinding, which provided warning about 
the risks associated with global imbalances. Third, the 
Fund proposed policy recommendations designed to 
avoid a sudden unwinding of imbalances. Fourth, it 
offered new, relevant procedures – Multilateral Con-
sultations – for a discussion and an agreement on nec-
essary policies. In 2006, the first Multilateral Consulta-
tions on global imbalances were attended by the US, 
China, the EU, Japan and Saudi Arabia.
There  is  a  rationale,  both  theoretical  and  practi-
cal, for the Fund’s coordinating role in dealing with 
global imbalances. Theses imbalances involve several 
externalities, which can be internalised in a coordi-
nated policy response, so that superior outcomes are 
achieved. Applying adequate national policies every-
where without coordination does not necessarily mean 
that  there  are  no  international  systemic  problems 
(Eichengreen, 2008).
The Fund’s platform can be helpful in working out 
an agreement on global imbalances and on their se-
verity, causes and policy measures when views, par-
ticularly  between  major  players,  are  divergent.  Ne-
gotiations held under the Multilateral Consultations 
arrived, indeed, at the Action Plan for each of the five 
participants. Despite that, however, the US still keeps 
blaming China for an undervaluation of its currency 
and threatening the Asian country with the status of 
the “currency manipulator”, whereas China keeps re-
proaching the US with the fiscal profligacy.
Two issues are relevant here. Firstly, the mechanism 
to bind participants so that they implement the agree-
ment, is not sufficiently effective. Participants oper-
ate in a Nash-type environment, in which they have 
incentives to renege from the agreed commitments. 
In particular, in the aftermath of the global financial 
crisis, countries may have temptations to use the ex-
change rates to promote their exports and that could 
lead to a process of competitive devaluations and cur-
rency wars. Secondly, the effectiveness of surveillance 12 R. Wilczyński   
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depends upon the credibility of the institution. The 
Fund’s credibility has been, and still is, challenged; the 
process of necessary governance reforms is on track, 
but not yet completed.
In order to improve surveillance over exchange rate 
policies and to reinforce its implementation, in 2007, 
the IMF has amended the 1977 Surveillance Decision. 
The main objective was to extend the Fund’s surveil-
lance on all major causes of external instability related 
to the exchange rate policies, in particular, to equip the 
IMF with the power to deal, in addition to competitive 
devaluations, with restraining by members’ apprecia-
tion, that would be consistent with fundamentals. The 
new concept of “external stability”, i.e. the balance of 
payment position, that is not generating – and not likely   
– to generate disruptive exchange rate movements, was 
expected to be useful in extending the scope of surveil-
lance. However, major players remain immune to the 
IMF recommendations regarding external stability; if 
these recommendations are not implemented, Article 
IV remains formally unbroken. What may be harmed 
here is rather (only) the reputation of the country.
During the global crisis, the Fund has shown prag-
matism, tailoring its recommendations on exchange 
rates to individual circumstances. In the case of Latvia, 
the IMF ultimately decided on maintaining the peg 
and did not insist on devaluation, which would entail 
negative spillover effects for the credibility of fixed re-
gimes in neighbouring countries aiming, as Latvia is, 
to implement the euro. In the case of Iceland, the Fund 
has  taken  into  consideration  the  need  for  financial 
flexibility and was in favour of a float.
Recent research on exchange rate regimes, includ-
ing  work  done  within  the  IMF,  explores  particular 
strengths  and  weaknesses  of  pegged,  intermediate 
and floating regimes, with the crisis risk to a country 
and to the speed of adjustment as well as risks to the 
whole international monetary system as key factors 
in trade-offs around the regimes (Ghosh et al., 2010). 
One of the challenging options for future research on 
exchange rate policies could be the monetary union 
and paths of the euro adoption since current policies 
of candidate countries vary broadly.
4. IMF Lending
Like  surveillance,  IMF  lending  also  serves  multiple 
purposes for the Fund. In particular, IMF lending pro-
grammes are instrumental not only in the resolution 
of the crisis in a member country’s economy, but also 
– through improving market confidence in a member 
– in the crisis prevention. They also help attract financ-
ing from sources other than the IMF (i.e. they catalyse 
financing) and help restrict the financial contagion. In 
order to fulfil these roles, the Fund needs adequate fi-
nancial resources as well as efficient vehicles necessary 
to channel funds when and to where they are needed.
Restricting contagion is particularly important in the 
global context. In theory, by providing liquidity when 
private  providers  are  reluctant  to  provide,  the  Fund 
helps prevent or reduce default of a debtor country and 
that outcome benefits also other countries. Otherwise, 
the equilibrium world interest rates would go up and 
borrowing costs would increase, which is a negative ex-
ternality; such an effect is also generated by the deterio-
ration of the macroeconomic situation by a systemically 
important economy (Clark & Huang, 2001).
The  demand  for  IMF  resources  has  significantly 
fluctuated over the past two decades. The 1990s and 
the early 2000s saw surges in demand due to lending 
programmes, which supported transformations in an 
emerging Europe as well as due to the wave of financial 
crises in emerging economies, from Mexico in 1994-
1995 to Argentina in 2001. Thereafter, until 2007, the 
trend has reversed for several reasons, including ample 
global liquidity; reduced vulnerabilities and, therefore, 
also needs for the balance of payment financing, an 
improved access for many developing economies to 
private financing as well as considerable growth of for-
eign reserves in these economies.
The global crisis of 2007-2010 has strongly tested 
the  Fund’s  financing  role.  In  2008  and  2009,  many 
emerging and developing economies experienced dra-
matic declines in capital inflows and in trade. The de-
mand for IMF financing has sharply increased. From 
September 2008 until March 2010, 21 countries ap-
plied for the IMF loans under stand-by arrangements 
totalling up to 57 billion dollars, whereas three coun-
tries applied for the flexible credit lines, which almost 
doubled stand-by lending and brought the total lend-
ing commitments of the Fund to approximately 160 
billion dollars.
Responding to the severe crisis, the IMF has taken 
extraordinary decisions on its resources. An additional 
allocation of SDR equivalent to 250 billion dollars and www.contemporary-economics.eu
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raising the total SDR holdings to over 300 billion dollars 
was agreed. The value of the members’ quotas, currently 
close to 370 billion dollars, will be doubled as a result of 
the 2010 quota reform. The resources borrowed under 
the New Arrangements to Borrow were increased from 
50 billion to approximately 580 billion dollars.
Prior  to  the  2007-2010  crisis,  the  IMF  has  em-
phasised  the  fact  that  in  many  emerging  European 
economies,  domestic  and  external  imbalances  were 
accumulated. These imbalances were manageable in 
good times, but the global crisis turned them into se-
vere problems. Under these circumstances, the Fund 
has brought into the region a badly needed liquidity 
which, however, was linked to the conditionality that 
commits  the  economies  to  necessary  adjustments. 
Against the backdrop of 2010, Greek sovereign debt 
crisis and its likely contagion to vulnerable Eurozone 
and other economies, the IMF declared its readiness 
to provide, on an individual basis, financial assistance 
totalling up to 200-250 billion euros. This declaration 
has materialised in the case of the financial support for 
Ireland towards the end of 2010. 
Over time, in order to adapt to a changing environ-
ment, the IMF has redesigned its lending frameworks, 
albeit usually on an ad hoc basis, with each adjustment 
targeted at a specific balance of payment problems. 
The global financial crisis has brought another sub-
stantial challenge to the Fund’s lending framework and 
financial  policies.  Many  economies,  which  in  terms 
of their fundamentals, were in a good or reasonable 
shape, remained nevertheless exposed to the interna-
tional financial contagion caused by shifts in market 
sentiments and were, therefore, at the risk of liquidity 
problems. The major response from the IMF to that 
challenge was the implementation of the new facility 
– a flexible credit line (FCL) for “strong performers” 
and of a precautionary credit line (PCL) for countries, 
which – due to somewhat weaker fundamentals and 
policies – do not qualify for the FCL. Both facilities are 
basically of a precautionary nature and are designed to 
signal market participants on countries with adequate 
policies,  i.e.  to  discriminate  among  economies,  to 
which investors could go with their resources.
In parallel to a debate on lending instruments, a dis-
cussion on international reserves seen as an insurance 
against crisis, is enhanced. It is likely that in the after-
math of the crisis, the demand for financial resources 
will increase due to the strengthened precautionary 
behaviour and possibly to a higher risk aversion. Glob-
al, long-term liquidity needs are projected to be clearly 
large as compared to their pre-crisis levels.
Many countries have accumulated foreign exchange 
reserves, which help them prevent and solve the crisis; 
reserves  are  available  promptly  and  without  condi-
tionality. But national reserves also entail costs as they 
yield a lower return than an interest rate to be paid on 
a country’s external debt and as they reduce the space of 
manoeuvre for domestic monetary policies. Moreover, 
at the global level, country reserves entail inefficiencies 
in terms of economies of scale as well as disadvantages 
as they contribute to global imbalances and to associ-
ated risks. As compared to practical benchmarks, such 
as indices of the import coverage, short-term debt or 
broad money, reserves of many countries are found to 
be excessive. International reserves of several emerg-
ing economies have been rising faster than their short-
term  external  debt  and  exceeding  the  benchmark, 
which is related to the vulnerability of the economy to 
a capital account crisis.
It is, therefore, suggested that the insurance against 
the crisis is – to some degree - moved to an interna-
tional level, including to the IMF. In order to play an 
increasing, anti-crisis role, the Fund would have coped 
with several challenges, including:
 -  to further expand and modernise its lending fa-
cilities so that countries are encouraged to draw on 
the IMF rather than hold their own reserves, when 
needed  (Helleiner, 2009);
-  to solve the associated moral hazard problems, e.g. 
by restricting payments to cases of crises triggered 
by exogenous shocks (Mateos y Lago et al., 2009);
-  to adjust to regional financial arrangements, e.g. in 
case of the coordinated EU-IMF balance of pay-
ments for support programmes.
  
5. IMF Credibility
An improved Fund offer in the field of surveillance 
and lending is highly relevant, but not entirely suffi-
cient, for a considerable strengthening of the role of 
the IMF in the global financial governance. Apart from 
higher efficiency, an enhanced credibility of the Fund 
is also needed so that member countries feel strong 
ownership  when  they  participate  in  IMF  activities. 
This credibility has been at stake, largely due to flaws 14 R. Wilczyński   
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in the internal governance of the institution as well as 
in the quality of surveillance and lending as perceived 
by some members.
An  internal  governance  has  several  components, 
which affect, directly or indirectly, the process of deci-
sion making. In the case of the international coopera-
tive institution, the appropriate voting structure is of 
prime significance. The voting structure in the IMF is 
largely determined by the structure of members’ quo-
tas, which are slightly corrected with the system of 
basic votes. 
The objective of the IMF quota is to reflect a coun-
try’s weight in the global economy and in the inter-
national financial system. The widespread recognition 
remains that the current quota structure still fails to 
meet its main objectives. The quota reforms agreed in 
2008 and 2010 will improve the alignment of the quota 
structure with the structure of the global economy and 
finance, but these reforms are not yet effective. Under 
the current quota structure, emerging economies are, 
in  broad  terms,  under-represented  while  advanced 
countries are over-represented. What matters here is 
the benchmark for the representation. Under the most 
usual and standard measurements, i.e. the country’s 
GDP-PPP share in the world GDP, the combined quota 
share in 2009 of four BRIC’s – Brazil, China, India and 
Russia - plus Mexico, was  approximately 100% lower 
than what it should have been. In the case of the Eu-
rozone economies combined, the misalignment was at 
approximately 50% to the opposite (see Table 1).
In addition to the GDP, IMF quotas include three 
other components: trade openness, international re-
serves and variability of flows. BRIC’s plus Mexico are 
modestly under-represented in terms of trade open-
ness  (measured  with  exports)  and  strongly  under-
represented in terms of reserves, whereas the US and 
the Eurozone countries remain, although to a different 
degree, over-represented (except trade openness in the 






US 20.5 9.9 1.7 17.7
Eurozone 15.2 28.8 9.1 23.1
BRICs + Mexico 25.7 15.1 44.5 12.2
Table 1. Macroeconomic measurements and IMF quotas of different economies in 2009 (% shares of totals)
Source: IMF.
The pattern of the relative over- and under-represen-
tation in the Fund is more complex. Among emerging 
economies are also over-represented countries, such as 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Argentina, Pakistan or Ni-
geria, whereas some of the advanced countries, such as 
Spain, Ireland or Luxembourg, are underrepresented. 
However, many sizeable Asian emerging economies, 
including  China,  Turkey,  South  Korea,  Thailand  or 
Vietnam, remain clearly under-represented. Under the 
2010 quota reform, there is a consensus on an ad hoc 
6% shift of quota shares to dynamic emerging and de-
veloping countries, but it remains to be seen whether it 
is satisfactory across the membership or further quota 
adjustments and realignments will be demanded. 
Everything above the quotas assumes that the cur-
rent quota formula is adequate. However, the formula 
is being contested on several fronts. One of the pro-
posals assumes incorporating the population variable 
into the formula, which would be much in favour of 
large emerging economies (population of BRICs plus 
Mexico is approximately 10 times higher than that of 
the US or the Eurozone). Another possible avenue 
is  to  include  some  measurements  of  the  financial 
openness of the economy. A discussion on the quota 
formula is to be reopened soon and to be completed 
until 2013. www.contemporary-economics.eu
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Conclusions
Over time, the IMF has been making strong efforts de-
signed to improve its policies in order to efficiently cope 
with the challenges originating from the continuously 
and increasingly changing financial environment. These 
challenges can be attributed to an increased volatility in 
international financial markets, which resulted in more 
frequent and deeper financial crises over the two recent 
decades.  Financial  crises  were  spread  internationally 
with the process of the financial contagion. Those de-
velopments call for enhancing the global financial gov-
ernance and the Fund is designed and equipped to play 
the central role in this process.
In response to the challenges, the IMF has been im-
proving its surveillance and lending policies as well as 
adjusting its resources, but the institution did not avoid 
mistakes and criticism. In the aftermath of the 2007-
2010 global financial crisis, several risks to the stability 
of the international financial system still remain and 
they represent remarkable problems for the Fund.
It is reasonable that the IMF policies continue shift-
ing the major emphasis from the crisis resolution to 
the crisis anticipation and prevention areas. The Fund 
should also remain sensitive to an increasing role of 
those policies and instruments, which go beyond the 
national scope. It is also desirable that the IMF im-
proves its credibility through a more adequate distri-
bution of the quota shares and of the voting power. 
The distribution of quotas needs further realignments 
of quota shares to real weights of Fund members in the 
global economy and finance. Finally and beyond the 
scope of this paper, an enhancing of the Fund’s role in 
the global financial governance depends also on the 
proper delineation of competencies between the IMF 
and other international financial institutions in order 
to avoid overlaps as well as loopholes in the process. 
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